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ABSTRACT
This paper extends the traditional analysis of the output e¤ect under monopoly
(third-degree) price discrimination to a multimarket Cournot oligopoly. Un-
der symmetric Cournot oligopoly (all rms selling in all markets) similar re-
sults to those under monopoly are obtained: in order for price discrimination
to increase total output the demand and inverse demand of the strong market
(the high price market) should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more
concave than the demand and inverse demand of the weak market (the low
price one). When competitive pressure (measured by the number of rms)
varies across markets the e¤ect of price discrimination on total output cru-
cially depends on what market, the strong or the weak, is more competitive.
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1 Introduction
With respect to uniform pricing, third-degree price discrimination generates
two e¤ects: rst, price discrimination causes a misallocation of goods from
high to low value users and, second, price discrimination a¤ects total out-
put.1 Therefore, a necessary condition for third-degree price discrimination
to increase social welfare is an increase in total output.2 As a result, a focal
point has been the analysis of the e¤ects of price discrimination on output.3
Since Robinson (1933) much research has addressed this issue.4 It is known
from Pigou (1920) that under linear demands price discrimination does not
change output. In the general non-linear case, however, the e¤ect of price
discrimination on output may be either positive or negative. It is also well
known (see, for example, Robinson, 1933, Silberberg, 1970, or Schmalensee,
1981) that when all the strong markets (markets where the optimal discrim-
inatory price exceeds the optimal single price) have concave demands and
the weak markets (where the optimal discriminatory prices are lower than
the single price) have convex demands (with at least one market with strict
concavity or convexity), then third-degree price discrimination increases out-
put. When strong markets have convex demands and weak markets concave
demands price discrimination reduces output. In the case in which all the
demand curves have similar curvature the answer is more complicated. Shih,
Mai and Liu (1988) and Cheung andWang (1994) obtain more general results
and Aguirre (2009), Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) and Cowan (2016)
show that the e¤ect of third-degree price discrimination on total output is
intrinsically related to both the shape of demands and inverse demands in
strong markets compared to the shape of direct and inverse demands in weak
markets.
1See, for example, Ippolito (1980), Schmalensee (1981), Aguirre (2012) or Aguirre,
Cowan and Vickers (2010) for explicit decompositions of the change in social welfare into
these two e¤ects: the misallocation e¤ect and the output e¤ect.
2See Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985) and Schwartz (1990). Ippolito (1980) and
Aguirre (2012) provide an alternative proof.
3It is assumed throughout the paper that all markets are served under both pricing
regimes, uniform pricing and price discrimination. The possibility that price discrimination
opens up new markets (and that may even yield Pareto improvements). See, for example,
Hausman and Mackie-Mason (1988).
4The literature includes Schmalensee (1981), Shih, Mai and Liu (1988), Cheung and
Wang (1994), Aguirre (2009), Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) and Cowan (2016) among
others.
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Over the last few decades much research has analyzed price discrimination
in oligopolistic markets both under price competition and quantity competi-
tion.5 Here we focus on price discrimination under quantity competition on
which a quote from Stole (2007) results relevant: "Perhaps the simplest model
of imperfect competition and price discrimination is the immediate extension
of Cournots quantity-setting, homogeneous-good game to rms competing
in distinct market segments."6 The Cournot model has been widely used to
analyze price discrimination in many di¤erent contexts.7 In this paper, we
extend the traditional analysis of the output e¤ect under monopoly third-
degree price discrimination to a multimarket Cournot oligopoly.8 We show
that under symmetric Cournot oligopoly (all rms selling in all markets) sim-
ilar results to those under monopoly are obtained: in order for total output to
increase with price discrimination the demand of the strong market (the high
price market) should be, as conjectured by Robinson (1933), more concave
than the demand of the weak market (the low price one). When competitive
pressure (measured by the number of rms) varies across markets the e¤ect
of price discrimination on total output crucially depends on what market, the
strong or the weak, is more competitive. Importantly, some new unexpected
results are obtained, even with linear demand. First, we show that price dis-
crimination in favor of the more competitive market is quite generally output
5Many papers have analyzed oligopolistic price discrimination under price competition.
See Holmes (1989), Corts (1998), Dastidar (2006) and Adachi and Matsushima (2014).
6Various empirical studies provide support for the assumption that Cournot competi-
tion prevails in some markets as, for instance, in the airline market, a market where price
discrimination is quite common (see, for example, Brander and Zhang, 1990, and Oum,
Zhang and Zhang, 1993).
7Neven and Phlips (1985), Howell (1991), Cheung and Wang (1997), Aguirre (2000),
Galera and Zaratiegui (2006), Hazledine (2006), Stole (2007), Hazledine (2010), Kutlu
(2012), Bakó and Kálecz-Simon (2012), Czerny and Zhang (2014), Kumar and Kutlu
(2015) and Aguirre (2016) consider price discrimination under quantity competition in the
nal good market. In a context of intertemporal price discrimination Dana and Williams
(2016) show how inventory controls can facilitate oligopoly price discrimination. There
is also an important literature that analyzes quantity competition in contexts of spatial
price discrimination: see, for instance, Hamilton, Thisse and Weskamp (1986). It is also
common in contexts of international trade to study price discrimination under Cournot
competition; see, for instance, the Brander and Krugmans (1983) model of reciprocal
dumping, a case of price discrimination, or Krugman (1989) for a general view.
8Our model of multimarket Cournot oligopoly can be seen as a particular case of mul-
tiproduct Cournot oligopoly (see, for instancem Johnson and Myatt,2006, and Armstrong
and Vickers, 2016).
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reducing, therefore leading to a welfare deterioration. This result maintains
unambiguosly under linear demand or when the strong market exhibits con-
vex demand and the weak market concave demand. Our results are in line
with those of Holmes (1989) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) who suggest that
price discrimination against the more competitive markets (measured by the
number of rms) might reduce social welfare through decreasing total out-
put. Second, when the competitive pressure is higher in the strong market
we obtain the important result that independently of the shape of demands
and inverse demands price discrimination can increase total output. In par-
ticular we show that even with linear demand price discrimination increases
total output.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the output e¤ect of
price discrimination for a Cournot oligopoly showing that the results crucially
depend on whether competitive pressure varies across markets and on which
market, the strong of the weak, is more competitive. Section 3 presents some
concluding remarks.
2 Analysis
Consider a Cournot oligopoly selling a homogeneous product in two perfectly
separated markets. Market 1 is served by n1 rms and market 2 by n2.
The inverse demand function in market i is given by pi(qi), where qi is the
quantity sold. Unit cost, c, is assumed constant. The prot function of rm
j in market i = 1; 2 is given by: ji(qji; q ji) = [ pi(qi)   c]qji, where qji is
the quantity sold by rm j in market i and q ji = qi   qji, which is assumed
to be strictly concave. We shall obtain the change in total output due to a
move from third-degree price discrimination to uniform pricing.
Under price discrimination rms present in both markets choose their
production in each market independently. By adding rst order conditions
(assuming an interior equilibrium with second order conditions satised) we
obtain that the equilbrium total output in market i satises:
ni[pi(q
d
i )  c] + qdi p
0
i(q
d
i ) = 0 i = 1; 2; (1)
where qdi denotes the Cournot total output in market i.
9 From condition (1)
9Following Kreps and Sheinkman (1983) Cournot competition can be interpreted as the
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we obtain that the equilibrium price can be written as:
pi(q
d
i ) =
c
1  1
ni"i(qdi )
i = 1; 2; (2)
where "i(qi) =   1p0i(qi)
pi(qi)
qi
is the elasticity of demand in market i = 1; 2.
Therefore, we obtain a generalization of the monopolistic price discrimination
rule to a Cournot oligopoly: p1(qd1) > p2(q
d
2) i¤ n1"1(q
d
1) < n2"2(q
d
2). From
now on, we assume that market 1 is the strong market, p1(qd1) > p2(q
d
2). Con-
sequently, if the number of rms does not vary accross markets the Cournot
price is higher in the market with the lower elasticity. The total output under
price discrimination is Qd =
P2
i=1 q
d
i which, given (1), can be expressed as:
Qd =
2X
i=1
qdi =  
2X
i=1
ni
[pi(q
d
i )  c]
p
0
i(q
d
i )
: (3)
In order to solve the problem under uniform pricing, we distinguish be-
tween rms that sell in both markets and rms that only sell in one of the
two markets. Assume that there are nB > 0 rms selling in both markets,
n1 nB > 0 rms selling only in market 1 and n2 nB > 0 rms selling only
in market 2. If we aggregate rst order conditions for rms that are only in
market i we get:
(ni   nB)[pi(q0i )  c] + q0iip
0
i(q
0
i ) = 0 i = 1; 2; (4)
where q0ii is the total output produced by rms only set in market i = 1; 2.
Under uniform pricing, a rm that sells in both markets has to adjust pro-
duction in order to maintain the same price in both markets.10 From the
reduced form of a two-stage game where rms rst choose capacities and then set prices.
dAspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gérard-Varet (1991), (2007) and dAspremont and
Dos Santos Ferreira (2009) consider other nice justications of quantity competition.
10Note that price discrimination might be illegal, or impracticable due to regulation or
arbitrage and the multimarket rms could be forced to adjust output across markets in
order to satisfy price uniformity. Or, equivalently, multimarket rms might sign most-
favored-customers (MFC) clauses with their clients committing to price uniformly (see,
for instance, Aguirre, 2000). The argument is as follows. Assume that multimarket rm
j adopts an MFC policy and that market 1 is strong. If rm j chooses its outputs qj1
and qj2 so that p1(qj1 + q j1) > p2(qj2 + q j2) then it must rebate [p1(qj1 + q j1) 
p2(qj2 + q j2)]qj1 to market 1 customers. Firm j can increase its prots by choosing an
output q
0
j1 > qj1, such that given q j1 and q j2, p2(qj2+q j2) is the price of both markets
obtaining [p2(qj2 + q j2)  c](q0j1 + qj1).
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rst order conditions and by adding over rms set in both markets we get:
nB[p1(q
0
1) c]p
0
2(q
0
2)+nB[p2(q
0
2) c]p
0
1(q
0
1)+q
0
B1p
0
1(q
0
1)p
0
2(q
0
2)+q
0
B2p
0
1(q
0
1)p
0
2(q
0
2) = 0;
(5)
where q0Bi is the total output sold in market i = 1; 2 by the rms selling in
both markets.11
Therefore:
q0B1p
0
1(q
0
1)p
0
2(q
0
2)+q
0
B2p
0
1(q
0
1)p
0
2(q
0
2) =  nB[p1(q01) c]p
0
2(q
0
2) nB[p2(q02) c]p
0
1(q
0
1):
(6)
q0B1 + q
0
B2 =  
nB[p1(q
0
1)  c]p02(q02) + nB[p2(q02)  c]p01(q01)
p
0
1(q
0
1)p
0
2(q
0
2)
: (7)
q0B1 + q
0
B2 =  nB
[p1(q
0
1)  c]
p
0
1(q
0
1)
  nB [p2(q
0
2)  c]
p
0
2(q
0
2)
: (8)
It is satised that p1(qd1) > p1(q
0
1) = p2(q
0
2) > p2(q
d
2) and the total output,
Q0 =
P2
i=1 q
0
i , can be expressed, given (4) and (8), as:
Q0 =
2X
i=1
q0i =  
2X
i=1
ni
[pi(q
0
i )  c]
p
0
i(q
0
i )
: (9)
We follow closely the analysis by Cheung and Wang (1997). Given con-
ditions (3) and (9), the change in total output is given by:
Q = Qd  Q0 =  
2X
i=1
ni
[pi(q
d
i )  c]
p
0
i(q
d
i )
+
2X
i=1
ni
[pi(q
0
i )  c]
p
0
i(q
0
i )
. (10)
We can rewrite (10) as:
Q =  
2X
i=1
(Z qdi
q0i
d

ni
[pi(qi)  c]
p
0
i(qi)
)
. (11)
Therefore, the change in total output can be expressed as:
11We assume that the bordered Hessian is negative denite.
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Q =  
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
[p
0
i(qi)]
2   [pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
;
=  
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
f1  [pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
gdqi
)
;
=
2X
i=1
 niqi +
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
: (12)
Expression (12) can be written as:
Q =
2X
i=1
 niqi  
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
Li(qi)"i(qi)C
I
i (qi)dqi
)
; (13)
where Li(qi) =
[pi(qi) c]
pi(qi)
is the Lerner index of market i, "i(qi) =   1p0i(qi)
pi(qi)
qi
is the elasticity of demand of market i and CIi (qi) = qi
p
00
i (qi)
p
0
i(qi)
is the adjusted
concavity of the inverse demand in market i (this is analogous to relative risk
aversion for a utility function). The adjusted concavity of the direct demand,
CDi (qi) =  p
00
i (qi)pi(qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
, is given by CDi (qi) = "i(qi)C
I
i (qi). Therefore we can
express the change in total output alternatively as:
Q =
2X
i=1
 niqi  
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
Li(qi)C
D
i (qi)dqi
)
: (14)
We next show that the change of total output crucially depends on
whether all rms are present in all markets.
(i) Symmetric Multimarket Cournot Oligopoly.
First, we consider a symmetric multimarket Cournot oligopoly with all
rms selling in all markets and therefore n1 = n2 = n. The change in total
output is (see, Cheung and Wang, 1997):
Q =
n
1 + n
2X
i=1
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
:
7
=   n
1 + n
2X
i=1
(Z qdi
q0i
Li(qi)"i(qi)C
I
i (qi)dqi
)
: (15)
One advantage of Cournot oligopoly is that it converges to the monopoly case
when n = 1. Under monopoly a move from uniform pricing to third-degree
price discrimination leads to (see, Cheung and Wang, 1994, Aguirre, 2009,
or Cowan, 2016):
Q =
1
2
2X
i=1
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
:
=  1
2
2X
i=1
(Z qdi
q0i
Li(qi)"i(qi)C
I
i (qi)dqi
)
: (16)
Therefore, we can immediately extend the results under monopoly obtained
by Pigou (1920), Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981) and, more recently, by
Shih, Mai and Liu (1988), Cheung and Wang, 1994, Aguirre, 2009, Aguirre,
Cowan and Vickers, 2010, and Cowan (2016) to a symmetric Cournot oligopoly.
For instance, under linear demand total output does not change both for a
monopoly and for a symmetric Cournot oligopoly independently of the num-
ber of rms (see Neven and Phlips, 1985, and Howell, 1991; Stole, 2007,
provides a more elegant proof). The next proposition summarizes the e¤ect
of third-degree price discrimination on total output under monopoly and
symmetric Cournot oligopoly.12
Proposition 1. E¤ect of third-degree price discrimination on total output
under monopoly and symmetric Cournot oligopoly.
(i) If both direct demand curves and inverse demand curves are more concave
in strong markets than in weak markets, then third-degree price discrimina-
tion increases total output.
(ii) If both direct demand curves and inverse demand curves are less (or
equally) concave in strong markets than in weak markets, then third-degree
price discrimination does not increase total output.
Proof. With respect to the results under monopoly, see the proof of Theorem
1 in Aguirre (2009) for the n-market case. In Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers
12Weyl and Fabinger (2013) suggest that results under monopoly might be extended to
symmetric imperfect competition.
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(2010), this result appears as a corollary of their Proposition 4, for the two-
market case. Cowan (2016) presents an elegant proof of case (i) for the
n-market case.13 Cheung and Wang (1994) for the case of monopoly and
Cheung and Wang (1997) for the case of Cournot oligopoly provide a weaker
version of this proposition.
(ii) Asymmetric Multimarket Cournot Oligopoly. Consider an asymmetric
multimarket Cournot oligopoly with n1 6= n2. The e¤ect of price discrim-
ination on total output crucially depends on which market, the strong or
the weak, exhibits more competitive pressure as measured by the number of
rms.
a) n2 > n1
When the weak market has more rms we can rewrite (12) as
Q =
2X
i=1
 niqi +
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
;
=  (n2   n1)q2   n1(q1 +q2)
+
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
;
=  (n2   n1)
1 + n1
q2 +
1
1 + n1
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
:(17)
Proposition 2. E¤ect of third-degree price discrimination on total output
when the weak market is more competitive.
If the competitive pressure, measured by the number of rms, is higher in
the weak market, it is ceteris paribus more probable that price discrimination
to reduce total output and therefore social welfare.
Proof. Note that the rst term in (17) is negative given that market 2 is the
weak market, q2 > 0, and it exhibits higher competitive pressure, n2 > n1.
Even with inverse and direct demands more concave in the strong market
price discrimination might reduce total output.
13See Weyl and Fabinger (2013) for a nice interpretation in terms of pass-through.
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Given that rst term in (17) is negative, we obtain the result that total
output (and, therefore, social welfare) might decrease independently of the
shape of inverse and direct demands when rms discriminate prices in favor
of the market with more competitive pressure. This result is in line with the
results of Holmes (1989) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) who suggest that
when discrimination is in favor of individuals for whom competition is more
intense, discrimination is more likely to be harmful.
b) n1 > n2
When the strong market has more rms we can rewrite (12) as
Q =
2X
i=1
 niqi +
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
;
=  (n1   n2)q1   n2(q1 +q2)
+
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
;
=  (n1   n2)
1 + n2
q1 +
1
1 + n2
2X
i=1
ni
(Z qdi
q0i
[pi(qi)  c]p
00
i (qi)
[p
0
i(qi)]
2
dqi
)
:(18)
Note that regardless of the shape of the inverse demands there exists a ten-
dency for price discrimination to increase total output given that the rst
term in (18) is positive because market 1 is the strong market, q1 < 0,
and it exhibits higher competitive pressure, n1 > n2. The next proposition
presents some perhaps unexpected results.
Proposition 3. E¤ect of third-degree price discrimination on total output
when the strong market is more competitive.
If competitive pressure measured by the number of rms is higher in the strong
market, independently of the shape of direct demands and inverse demands
total output can increase with price discrimination..
Proof. Note that the rst term in (18) is positive given that market 1 is
the strong market, q1 > 0, and it exhibits higher competitive pressure,
n1 > n2. Even with inverse and direct demands more concave in the weak
market price discrimination might increase total output.
Note that when the strong market exhibits more competitive pressure, n1 >
n2, general results of part (i) in Proposition 1 maintains: if both direct de-
10
mand curves and inverse demand curves are more concave in strong markets
than in weak markets, then third-degree price discrimination increases total
output. However, now it is possible price discrimination leads to an increase
in total output when inverse and direct demands are not more concave in the
strong markets. In particular, the next corollary states that the most cited
result from Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933) does not maintain yet.
Corollary 1. Total output increases with price discrimination under linear
demand.
Proof. Note that the second term in (18) is zero under linerar demand.
So given that market 1 is the strong market, q1 > 0, if it exhibits higher
competitive pressure, n1 > n2 then the rst term in (18) is strictly positive.
These results sharply contrast with the well-known results under monopoly
and symmetric Cournot oligopoly that price discrimination maintains total
output unchanged with linear demand.
3 Concluding remarks
The analysis of the e¤ects of third-degree price discrimination on total out-
put and, therefore, on social welfare has been the focus of much theoretical
research beginning at least from the pioneering work by Robinson (1933).
In this paper, we show that the results under monopoly can be directly
extended to a Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous product in the case in
which all rms are established in all markets. When competitive pressure
measured by the number of rms varies across markets we nd some perhaps
unexpected results. We show that when competitive pressure is higher in the
strong market there is a tendency for price discrimination to increase output.
On the other hand, price discrimination tends to reduce total output when
competitive pressure is higher in the weak market, even with linear demand.
In this paper the market structure is considered as exogenous. Future
research may consider extending the analysis to endogenous market structure.
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